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CHAPTER 7 OR CHAPTER 13: GUIDING
CONSUMER DEBTOR CHOICE UNDER THE
BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT
DOUGLAS Q. WICKHAMt
In the debate over bankruptcy reform during the 1970s some crit-
ics urged that a counseling service for consumer debtors be engrafted
onto the process.' It was more or less assumed that attorneys and
judges could not or would not provide what was viewed as a necessary
social service. Congress, however, chose not to change the essentially
remedial nature of the bankruptcy statutes. It cannot be the function of
statutory remedies to infuse into debtors better judgment than they had
before, nor can they ordinarily alter the fortunes of individuals or busi-
nesses. A growing number of both public and private agencies, how-
ever, are attempting to educate and counsel the participants in our
consumer credit society.2 Sometimes they experience success in the in-
formal adjustment of an individual's debts. Meanwhile, the remedies
legislated by Congress remain available to provide relief when infor-
mal adjustment fails.
It is the responsibility of the practicing bar to provide informed
access to these statutory remedies and to execute each remedial pro-
ceeding to the client's maximum advantage. Debtor relief has tradi-
tionally been considered a mystery and a specialty within the
profession, but the problems of insolvent consumer debtors can and
should be treated as an accepted facet of general practice. Debtor cli-
ents must be guided to an informed decision about whether to seek
statutory relief and how to choose between Chapters 73 and 134 of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. Though the Reform Act has un-
doubtedly altered the choices that certain clients would make, the ana-
- Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of Law. B.A. 1963, LL.B. 1966, Yale
University, LL.M. 1971, Harvard University.
1. Girth, The Bankruptcy Reform Process: Maximizing Judicial Control in Wage Earners'
Plans, 11 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 51, 68-69 (1977).
2. A. COHEN, DEBTOR-CREDITOR RELATIONS UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY ACT OF 1978
(1979) 189-216, provides an excellent introduction to the range of debt counseling services and
state regulation of them.
3. 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 701-766 (West 1979).
4. Id. §§ 1301-1330.
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lytic process confronting the attorney remains the same.5 The attorney
must determine the appropriate remedy, properly prepare the case,
support the client during the proceeding, and counsel the client about
post-proceeding creditors' rights and debtor remedies.
I. GUIDING THE CLIENT'S CHOICE
A. Straight Bankruptcy
Chapter 7 bankruptcy, with its discharge of unsatisfied debt, can
provide the most immediate and drastic relief for an insolvent con-
sumer debtor. No course of action can be chosen intelligently without
calculating the probable dollar value of this remedy for each client.
There are major improvements in the effectiveness of a bankruptcy dis-
charge under the Reform Act,6 but the basic remedial formula is simply
stated and remains the same: the debtor gives up all nonexempt prop-
erty for liquidation and distribution to creditors in return for a dis-
charge of all scheduled, dischargeable debts. A discharge occasionally
is denied, however, and even when granted does not eliminate auto-
matically the rights of every creditor.' The impact of this formula on
the individual client, therefore, must be analyzed and compared with
alternatives before a client can make an informed choice among avail-
able courses of conduct.
1. Property Given Up
One of the important changes for consumer debtors under the Re-
form Act is the creation of federal bankruptcy exemptions.' One who
is not judgment proof under a given state's exemption laws may effec-
tively be so in a bankruptcy proceeding.9 With the possible exception
of the $7,500 homestead equity, the dollar values provided in Reform
Act exemptions are likely to cover all the property owned by most low
and moderate income families who are forced to seek statutory relief.
Prior contractual waivers of exemption are specifically made unen-
5. See Wickham, Bankruptcy or Not? Advicefor Attorneys Who Counsel Consumer Debtors,
41 TENN. L. REV. 667 (1974).
6. See Rendleman, The Bankruptcy Discharge: TowardA Fresher Start, this Symposium.
7. See text accompanying notes 16-33 infra.
8. 11 U.S.C.A. § 522 (West 1979); see Vukowich, Debtor's Exemption Rfthts Under the
Bankruptcy Reform Act, this Symposium.
9. Any state exemption package less than $7900 is automatically less than the absolute mini-
mum available in bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(d)(5) (West 1979).
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forceable.'t Further relief is provided because nonpurchase money
liens on exempt items retained for personal use can be avoided in a
bankruptcy proceeding. ' Debtors are given the option of taking their
state exemption package if it is more advantageous.12 Perhaps the best
evidence of the relative generosity of this Reform Act exemption pack-
age is that some states have passed statutes specifically denying their
domiciliaries its benefit. 3
The more comprehensive definition of estate property under the
Reform Act has eliminated some prior situations in which tort claims
were not considered part of the bankrupt's estate. 4 Now all existing
causes of action are estate property subject to liquidation. From the
debtor's point of view the only surprise losses of property would be
property included in the estate under the windfall clauses,' 5 and thus,
in calculating the potential remedial effect of Chapter 7 relief, the attor-
ney should be aware of dying relatives or pending divorce settlements.
2. Discharge
a. -4 vailability
Only a few of the general bars to discharge1 6 are of potential sig-
nificance to the consumer debtor. The six-year bar of a prior bank-
ruptcy discharge ordinarily will be the major eligibility barrier. The
Reform Act has made one significant change in this area of discharge
availability. As before, completion of a Chapter 13 extension plan in
which all creditors are paid in full does not raise the time bar,17 but
10. Id. § 522(e).
11. Id. § 522(f).
12. Id. § 522(b).
13. H.R. 2305, 34th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess., ch. 59, § 1, 1980 Ariz. Legis. Serv. No. 3, at 132
(amending ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33-1133 (West Cum. Supp. 198); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 222.20
(West Cum. Supp. 1979); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13:3881(B) (West Cum. Supp. 1980); OHIo REv.
CODE ANN. § 2329.66.2 (Page Cum. Supp. 1979); VA. CODE § 34-3.1 (Cum. Supp. 1979). The
Ohio exemption statute, however, roughly parallels the new federal exemptions. Compare OHIO
REV. STAT. ANN. § 2329.66 (Page Cum. Supp. 1979) with 11 U.S.C.A. § 522 (West 1979).
14. 11 U.S.C.A. § 541 (West 1979). For example, under § 70(a)(5) of the old Act, I1
U.S.C.A. § I 10(a)(5) (1976) (repealed 1978), causes of action that creditors could not reach did not
come into the estate. In re Anderson, 345 F. Supp. 840 (E.D. Tenn. 1972).
15. 11 U.S.C.A. § 541(a)(5) (West 1979) (property that the debtor acquires within 180 days
after filing the petition by bequest, devise, inheritance, property settlement with the debtor's
spouse, or as the beneficiary of a life insurance policy or death benefit plan included in the
debtor's estate).
16. See id. § 727:
17. Compare id. § 727(a)(9)(A) with Bankruptcy Act § 14(c)(5), 11 U.S.C. § 32(c)(5) (1976)
(repealed 1978). Cf. Perry v. Commerce Loan Co., 383 U.S. 392 (1966) (wage-earner extension
plan not barred by discharge in bankruptcy within previous six years).
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under the Reform Act, completion of a good-faith, best-effort composi-
tion plan in which the payments total seventy percent will not raise the
time bar either. 8
Debtors who have made fraudulent conveyances within the past
year are also ineligible for discharge. t9 The essence of a fraudulent
conveyance is either the transfer of property by sale or mortgage for
less than fair consideration while insolvent, or the retention of posses-
sion of sold or mortgaged property under circumstances designed to
mislead creditors.20 Traditional fraudulent conveyance law requires
the creditor seeking relief to prove the debtor's intent to defraud, and
this same element must be specifically found before a discharge is re-
fused.2 The debtor who has taken ill-advised steps to make himself
judgment proof by putting everything in the name of a spouse or rela-
tive will therefore have to wait one year before seeking a discharge
without the risk of successful creditor or trustee objection.
Failure to cooperate during the proceeding can bar the dis-
charge,22 but this factor is easily within the client's control and should
not affect calculations of probable discharge value. Although few con-
sumer bankrupts fail to receive a discharge, it is important to ensure
that the client is eligible and does cooperate. The consequences of an
unsuccessful Chapter 7 proceeding are disastrous. Nonexempt prop-
erty is still liquidated, but by operation of the statute any debts sched-
uled in the proceeding will remain nondischargeable in any subsequent
straight bankruptcy.
23
b. Debts and Rights Not Affected
The debtor who obtains a Chapter 7 discharge does not leave all
his creditors behind. Several types of creditor claims may be excepted
from the effect of a discharge; the Reform Act has made no major
18. 11 U.S.C.A. § 727(a)(9)(B) (West 1979). The statute presently does not require the
debtor's "best effort" for confirmation of a plan under § 1325. Contra. In re Burrell, 2 West
BANKR. REP. 650 (N.D. Cal. 1980). The Senate version of a technical amendment bill would add
such a requirement. S. 658, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 188 (1979); S. REP. No. 305, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. 14 (1979). As before, a straight bankruptcy discharge raises the six year time bar. 11
U.S.C.A. § 727(a)(8) (West 1979).
19. 11 U.S.C.A. § 727(a)(2) (West 1979). Some older authorities are split on whether reac-
quisition of the property absolves the discharge bar. Compare In re Jacobsen, 9 F.2d 139 (D.S.D.
1925) with In re Williams, 286 F. 135 (W.D.S.C. 1921).
20. D. EPSTEIN, DEBTOR CREDITOR LAYw IN A NUTSHELL 67-73 (2d ed. 1980).
21. Comment, 22 VILL. L. REv. 1042 (1977).
22. 11 U.S.C.A. § 727(a)(6) (West 1979).
23. Id. § 523(a)(9). Inability to pay the fees will now simply cause dismissal of the case.
Compare id. § 707(2) with Bankruptcy Act § 14(c)(8), 11 U.S.C. § 32(c)(8) (1976) (repealed 1978).
[Vol. 58
19801 CHAPTER 7 OR CHAPTER 13 819
changes here. 4 Four of these claims are most likely to affect the con-
sumer debtor. Payments in the nature of alimony25 and most tax
debts26 remain nondischargeable whether or not the creditor seeks a
judgment to that effect in the bankruptcy proceeding. Additional situa-
tions may arise in which the affected creditors must obtain a judgment
of nondischargeability.27 Credit card companies were making greater
use of the false pretenses clause of the old Act to except from discharge
major debts incurred on the eve of bankruptcy,28 and that provision has
24. 11 U.S.C.A. § 523 (,Vest 1979). Certain educational loans were added to the nondis-
chargeable list. Id. § 523(a)(8). This provision in some respects continues prior law. See S. REP.
No. 230, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 reprinted in [19791 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1882-83.
Under the old Bankruptcy Act, educational loans insured or guaranteed under the authority of the
Higher Education Act of 1965 were dischargeable in bankruptcy only upon terms imposed by the
Higher Education Act. See Education Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-482, § 127(a), 90
Stat. 2081, 2141 (repealed 1978). Congress intended to preserve this provision of the former law
when enacting the new Code in 1978, but, in attempting to transfer the relevant language from
Title 20 (Education) to Title 11 (Bankruptcy), Congress erred in two respects. First, the nondis-
chargeability provision of the Bankruptcy Code, as originally enacted, related only to loans made
by governmental units or nonprofit institutions of higher education. Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-598, § 101, 92 Stat. 2549 (amended 1979). This failed to take into account that the student
loan programs administered by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare under the
Higher Education Act insure loans made by profit-making institutions of higher education as well
as nonprofit institutions. Second, while the new Code nondischargeability provision did not be-
come effective until October 1, 1979, the repeal of the nondischargeability provisions of Title 20
was effective November 6, 1978, the date of enactment of the new Code. Thus, a gap was created
in the prohibition on the discharge of educational loans. See S. REP. No. 230, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1-3, reprinted in [1979] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1882, 1882-84. This was remedied on
August 14, 1979, when Congress restored the old provision for the month and a half that remained
before the new Code became effective. Act of Aug. 14, 1979, Pub. Law No. 96-56, 93 Stat. 387.
Rather than restoring the repealed provision of the Higher Education Act, however, Congress
chose to reinstate nondischargeability for educational loans by amending the old Bankruptcy Act,
which had less than 50 days to live. Id. In addition to closing the gap in the prohibition on the
nondischargeability of educational loans, the August 1979 legislation also expands the reach of the
nondischargeability provision of the new Code by eliminating the requirement that a loan, if it is
to be nondischargeable, must be made by a governmental unit or nonprofit institution of higher
education. The present § 523 excepts from discharge any debt "for an educational loan made,
insured, or guaranteed by a governmental unit, or made under anyprogram funded in whole or in
part by a governmental unit or a nonprofit institution of higher education." Act of Aug. 14, 1979,
Pub. L. No. 96-56, § 3, 93 Stat. 387 (emphasis added) (codified at I 1 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(8) (West
1979)). Thus, not only is the former law relating to nondischargeability of loans insured or guar-
anteed under the Higher Education Act restored, but also any other educational loan made, in-
sured or guaranteed by a state, municipality or foreign state, or agencies thereof, or made under a
program funded by any nonprofit institution of higher education has become nondischargeable.
See 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(21) (West 1979) (definition of "governmental unit").
25. 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(5) (West 1979). The distinction between support payments and
property settlements is maintained. Its application has been a matter of some difficulty. See
Swann, Dischargeability of Domestic Obligations in Bankruptcy, 43 TENN. L. REv. 231 (1976).
26. 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(1) (West 1979). In general, unpaid taxes can only become dis-
chargeable if there has been no willfull evasion or fraud and if the IRS has been lax in its normal
audit and enforcement procedures.
27. See id. § 523(c).
28. Affiliated Bank v. Dyer (In re Dyer), 4 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 180 (W.D. Wis. 1978); Nevada
Nat'l Bank v. Schneider (In re Schneider), 3 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 175 (D. Nev. 1977); Mechanics Bank
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been retained under the Reform Act. 29 The vast amount of dis-
chargeability litigation and creditor abuse that was engendered by the
old Act's prohibition on the discharge of debts incurred through the use
of a false financial statement, however, should be greatly reduced by
the Reform Act's requirement of four elements of creditor proof on
these claims.3"
The rough dollar effect of a discharge in bankruptcy now can be
calculated for a given client in terms of property loss and debt effec-
tively discharged. There remain two additional considerations before
the full practical worth of that discharge can be predicted accurately.
The liability of co-signers is not affected by a bankruptcy discharge.
31
Should a debtor have solvent co-signers, a Chapter 7 discharge will
only shift the creditor focus to them. Losing the friendship of co-sign-
ers forced to pay discharged debts will diminish severely its apparent
dollar worth to the client.
One aspect of bankruptcy often not fully understood is that the
discharge does not in itself affect any lien that a creditor may hold. If
all a bankrupt's property is liquidated, then liens can be satisfied only
from sale proceeds. Particularly under the more generous set of Re-
form Act exemptions, however, a debtor will be able to retain much of
his property, and any encumbered nonexempt property with no realiza-
ble equity will be abandoned to him by the trustee.32 If the client is
willing to give up such property, then it can be repossessed by the cred-
itor who holds the lien on it and the matter is ended. More often, how-
ever, retention of the property will seem to be essential, and the client
will have to avoid defaulting to those creditors whose liens were not
eliminated successfully during the proceeding.
33
v. DiPrisco (ln re DiPrisco), 2 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 1724 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Fourth Nat'l Bank v, Portz
(In re Portz), 1 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 51 (M.D. Ga. 1974); Inre Masek, I Bankr. Ct. Dec. 51 (N.D. Iowa
1974).
29. Id. § 523(a)(2)(A).
30. 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(2)(B) (West 1979) requires that creditors prove a false, written
financial statement made with intent to deceive upon which the creditor relied. C.I.T. Fin. Servs.,
Inc. v. Gabriel (Inre Gabriel), 2 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 128 (W.D. Mo. 1976), is a typical outcome. The
incentive for creditors to litigate this question should be dampened further by the provision for
payment of a winning debtor's attorney's fee. 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(d) (West 1979).
31. 11 U.S.C.A. § 524(e) (West 1979).
32. Id. § 554.
33. See text accompanying notes 82-84 infra.
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B. Alternatives to Straight Bankruptcy
1. Chapter 13--Consumer
One might wonder why, under the Reform Act, debt repayment
under a Chapter 13 plan would be considered at all. In most situations
one can obtain a discharge of debt without giving up any property be-
cause of the more generous exemptions available. Chapter 13, how-
ever, may provide broader relief than Chapter 7 in two important
respects. First, a discharge is available to the debtor who completes
payment under a confirmed plan even though he would be ineligible
under Chapter 7.34 Second, there is much less nondischargeable debt
under Chapter 13 than under 7.35 Because creditors no longer exercise
a vote in the plan confirmation process, debtors in theory can offer
nothing to their creditors and still have their plans confirmed.3 6 Plans
offering to pay as little as to five to ten percent of creditor claims are
being confirmed in Chicago37 and Philadelphia,38 but in some other
districts much more must be offered before a Chapter 13 plan is con-
firmed because the judges feel that the debtor's best effort should be put
forth whether or not the statute specifically requires it.39 Thus, at least
in some places, a much more extensive discharge under Chapter 13
may be available to the debtor for little more than the cost of Chapter
7.
Congress may decide to "equalize" the discharge available under
34. Compare 11 U.S.C.A. § 1328(a) (West 1979) with id. § 727(a). The Chapter 7 discharge
provision states that "[tihe court shall grant the debtor a discharge, unless" anyone of nine situa-
tions is present-for example, if the debtor has received a discharge under Chapter 7 within the 6
years preceding the present petition. Id. § 727(a)(8). On the other hand, the court in a Chapter 13
case is required to give a discharge "[a]s soon as practicable after completion by the debtor of all
payments under the plan, unless the court approves a written waiver of discharge." Id. § 1328(a).
This discharge, however, does not apply to several specific kinds of debt. See note 35 infra.
35. The only nondischargeable debts are alimony and the unpaid balance on a home mort-
gage. Compare id. § 1328(a) with id. § 523. The § 1328(b) "hardship" discharge, which allows a
discharge in certain cases although not all of the payments under the plan have been made, is
subject to all the § 523 exceptions to dischargeability. Id. § 1328(c)(2).
36. Id. § 1325(a)(4) requires only that unsecured creditors receive no less than in a Chapter 7
liquidation for a plan to be confirmed. In most cases this need only be greater than zero. Prior
law required acceptance by a majority in number and amount of unsecured creditors. Bankruptcy
Act § 652, I1 U.S.C. § 1052 (1976) (repealed 1978).
37. Remarks of Professor Robert Ginsberg, Panel Discussion of Bankruptcy Reform Act,
American Association of Law Schools, Section on Creditors' & Debtors Rights, in Phoenix, Ariz.
(Jan. 4, 1980).
38. Remarks of Professor Arnold Cohen. Id.
39. Remarks of Donald Billings, Esq., of Winston-Salem, N.C. and Gerald Smith, Esq., of
Phoenix, Ariz. Id. See In re Burrell, 2 B.R. 650 (N.D. Cal. 1980); In re Campbell, 3 B.R. 57 (S.D.
Cal. 1980); Cf. In re Terry, 3 B.R. 63 (W.D. Ark. 1980) (plan approved with no payment to
creditors).
1980]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Chapters 7 and 13.40 If this happens the debtor's choice will depend
largely on moral attitude about repayment and prognosis of future
credit availability. Of course, the critical attitude here is that of the
client and not of the attorney. Debtors who prefer to attempt repay-
ment under a Chapter 13 plan will find their ability enhanced in that
unearned interest need not be paid.4' Additional scaling down of un-
secured debt may be achieved by fashioning composition plans, and
the Reform Act no longer requires creditor agreement prior to confir-
mation.42 Creditors holding liens that can withstand the statutory
avoidance powers need only be paid the present equivalent of their al-
lowed secured claim over the course of the plan in order for it to be
confirmed.43
There are two additional situations in which a debtor might prefer
a Chapter 13 repayment plan over a Chapter 7 straight bankruptcy. A
debtor with a co-signer problem will find that under the Reform Act
the Chapter 13 automatic stay extends to creditor action against those
co-signers. 44 While the stay is limited to prevent its manipulation, it
will prevent coercion of co-signers while a consumer debtor pays on a
less onerous schedule. In some situations this may be worth the addi-
tional dollar cost of obtaining the Chapter 13 discharge.
The debtor with significant nonexempt property will be able to re-
tain that property45 while repaying debts under the control and protec-
tion of the court in a Chapter 13 proceeding. As previously observed,
there are likely to be few debtors with significant nonexempt property
under the Reform Act. Nevertheless, one sizeable consumer group that
is likely to have significant nonexempt property will be the elderly
whose homes are fully paid. An elderly family living in a state whose
homestead exemption is inadequate may protect its equity by using a
Chapter 13 proceeding to scale debts down to a level that is within an
inflation-eroded fixed income. Moreover, debtors in states that have
passed statutes denying their domiciliaries the benefit of the federal ex-
emptions46 will find Chapter 13 relatively more attractive to the extent
40. The Senate-passed Technical Amendments Bill so provides. S. 658, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 188 (1979); see S. REP. No. 305, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 14 (1979).
41. 11 U.S.C.A. § 502(b)(2) (West 1979).
42. See note 36 supra.
43. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1325(a)(5) (West 1979). Prior law required each secured creditor "dealt
with" by the plan to accept it before confirmation. Bankruptcy Act § 652, 11 U.S.C. § 1052 (1976)
(repealed 1978).
44. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1301 (West 1979).
45. Id. § 1327(b).
46. See text accompanying note 13 supra.
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that the available state exemptions are less than what the federal ex-
emptions would have been.
2. Chapter 13-Small Business
Expanded eligibility criteria have added a new dimension to
Chapter 13. The small sole proprietor with regular income whose debt
does not exceed statutory limits may opt for rehabilitation under Chap-
ter 13 as an alternative to the more complicated Chapter 11. 4 1 Any
business debtor thus eligible will face a choice among liquidation and
its alternatives, and the considerations for these individuals are similar
to those for consumer debtors.
The operator who is willing to have his business liquidated must
either use Chapter 7 or negotiate a composition agreement with all of
his creditors in order to receive a discharge of remaining unpaid debt
and a personal fresh start 8 One who simply wishes to pay off some or
all of his old business debt out of future work earnings would be in
much the same situation as a consumer debtor. The likelihood of non-
exempt property would be somewhat higher, however, in the small
business situation and these debtors would thus have more to gain by
using the opportunity to retain that property afforded by the Chapter
13 option. Direct attempts to rehabilitate a business can now proceed
under Chapter 13 when a workout cannot be negotiated. A Chapter 13
proceeding, however, suggests a major anomaly as yet unexplored ei-
ther in the literature or in early experience with the Reform Act.
Consumer debtors in Chapter 13 are generally placed under suffi-
cient control so that no significant new credit can be undertaken while
old debts are being repaid.49 It is not, however, possible for a business
to continue and to generate earnings unless it can have access to new
credit. The Reform Act does provide that a business in Chapter 13 can
obtain credit in the same manner as a business in reorganization under
Chapter 11 .5 The difficulty is that successful business reorganizations
47. 11 U.S.C.A. § 109(e) (West 1979). An individual with regular income is one "Whose in-
come is sufficiently stable and regular to enable such individual to make payments under a plan
under Chapter 13." Id. § 101(24). Top debt limits are $100,000 unsecured and $350,000 secured.
Id. § 109(e). Contingent or unliquidated debt does not count within these limits. Id.
48. State liquidation proceedings that provide for discharge of debt are superceded by federal
bankruptcy provisions. International Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261 (1929).
49. It was a common practice under the old Act to place such a clause in Chapter 13 plans in
order to induce the creditor acceptances required for confirmation. This is no longer necessary
under the Reform Act, but trustee approval is required for post-petition claims to be included in
plans or modified plans. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1305(c) (West 1979).
50. Id. § 1304.
19801
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
under Chapter 11 have been premised on the existence of an active and
informed creditors committee, but the Reform Act does not provide for
any similar entity in a Chapter 13 composition. While one might ap-
plaud the elimination of threshold creditor control from consumer re-
payment proceedings under Chapter 13,- 1 one wonders where the
balancing force will be found to control the small business operator
who uses the proceeding to effect a drastic reduction in trade debts.
Recall that at least in some areas, a more extensive discharge may be
obtained in Chapter 13 under the umbrella of court protection while
offering very little by way of payment. 2 Perhaps lenders will be un-
willing to extend further credit to any business debtors who so use
Chapter 13, but we shall have to see how the markets adjust. Attorneys
who counsel small businesses are not likely to let this situation remain
long unexploited.
3. Agreed Solutions or Workouts
Both Chapters 7 and 13 involve considerable amounts of time and
money; yet without creditor agreement, debtors must use them to ob-
tain relief. Because the vast majority of consumer bankruptcies yield
nothing for creditors, however, they have a definite interest in working
something out with their debtors. Indeed, most observers of the con-
sumer credit scene report that both in theory and in practice many
creditors are willing to work something out and will refrain from more
drastic measures so long as regular payments can reasonably be ex-
pected.5 3 Social service agencies can facilitate this process. 54 The at-
torney can be more helpful in a situation in which individual creditor
action has been more forceful and perhaps in violation of recently en-
acted collection control legislation.51 If creditors holding a significant
56
5 1. Although Judge Hughes has listed elimination of creditor control among the "potential
abuses of Chapter 13," Hughes, Chapter 13"r Poientialfor 4buse, this Symposium, because con-
sumer debtors have insufficient power to bargain for compositions, court control seems more ap-
propriate for consumer 13's. Business debtors, on the other hand, do have bargaining power, and
in this area Judge Hughes' remarks are on target.
52. See text accompanying notes 36-38 supra.
53. Professor Leff has fully explained the theory, Leff, Injury, Ignorance and Spte-the Dy.
namics of Coercive Collection, 80 YALE L.J. I (1970), and many have observed the practice, e.g.,
Neustadter, Consumer Insolvency Counselingfor Californians in the 1980':, 19 SANTA CLARA L.
Rv. 817, 823-24 (1979).
54. See note 2 and accompanying text supra.
55. See, e.g., Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692L (Supp. 1 1977).
56. The portion held by the creditor becomes significant when the client would rather take
voluntary bankruptcy than leave this amount of undischarged debt outstanding.
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portion of the client's debt are unwilling to compromise, then a statu-
tory proceeding will be necessary for the client to obtain any relief.
For the consumer debtor, a full-scale restructuring of debts by
contract is nearly always an impossibility because there is nothing of
value to offer the creditors in return. For the small business with Chap-
ter 13 eligibility, however, such an agreed solution may be a more real-
istic possibility. The discharge from debt under a composition contract
is in some respects better than under the statute. It does not raise any
time bar to the later use of statutory remedies. Unless the contract spe-
cifically states otherwise, sureties are discharged as well." Recalcitrant
creditors can be told that a statutory proceeding with its higher over-
head, lesser dividend, and absence of creditor control is their alterna-
tive. It has been estimated, however, that a dividend of more than
twenty percent must be available before such propositions will interest
creditors,5" and negotiated solution remains feasible only if there have
been no major levies or preferences involving the debtor's property.5 9
II. PREPARING THE CASE
If Chapter 7 is the client's informed choice, certain preparations
are necessary before initiating the proceeding. It is not enough to simp-
ly fill out the voluminous forms and schedules filed with the petition.
Two additional areas are of particular concern if the client is to obtain
maximum benefit from use of the remedy. The attorney's first objective
must be to see that the client's asset package will receive maximum
protection under the available exemptions. While it is considered
fraud to obtain new assets on credit and turn them into exempt prop-
erty while contemplating bankruptcy, it is quite legal and proper to
rearrange one's existing assets to take full advantage of all available
shelters,60 and the responsible attorney should so advise his client.6'
57. RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY § 122 (1941). Cf. 11 U.S.C.A. Act § 524(e) (West 1979) (dis-
charge does not affect liability of any entity other than discharged debtor).
58. See Davenport, Businesses Beyond Help: Liquidation and Winding Up, 1958 U. ILL. L.F.
585, 598 (1958).
59. Although the overhead cost of a statutory liquidation is high, creditors who have lost the
individual race for assets may use the trustee avoidance powers to obtain a share in those assets.
The powers are well explained in D. EPSTEIN, supra note 20, at 175-226.
60. See Resnik, Prudent Planning or Fraudulent Transfer? The Use of Nonexempt Assets to
Purchase or Improve Exempt Property on the Eve of Bankrupltcy, 31 RIrrGERS L. REv. 615, 629-38
(1978).
61. Professor Resnik explores the ethical situation and discusses the impact of cases such as
Rameker v. Schwingle (In re Schwingle), 4 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 434 (W.D. Wis. 1978) (debtor denied
discharge after following attorney's advice to reacquire homestead, which had been sold to sons
under a mortgage note) Resnik, supra note 60, at 639-46.
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A second area of preparation is to check the status of secured cred-
itors. It is in the client's interest to determine if any secured creditors
are vulnerable to the general range of trustee avoidance powers. If a
security interest remains off record,62 if the security interest was per-
fected more than ten days after the loan and within ninety days of the
petition,63 if the security interest was given by the client within ninety
days of the petition to cover an old unsecured debt,6 or if a lien has
been taken by judicial process within ninety days of the petition,65 the
debtor's attorney should recognize that trustee avoidance action may be
available. The post-bankruptcy rights of these creditors in exempt or
abandoned collateral thus may be eliminated by trustee avoidance ac-
tion, and this, along with the general discharge, will totally remove
them from the post-proceeding picture. Although the Reform Act se-
verely limits reaffirmation of discharged debts,66 the elimination of
faulty liens will provide the debtor a much greater measure of relief
from legitimate creditor pressure after the case is closed.
III. CLIENT SUPPORT
During the proceeding itself there are three major areas of interest
to both the attorney and his client. First, the client should be made
aware that presence and truthfulness during his examination at the first
meeting of creditors are absolute necessities. Failure to appear or to
answer proper questions are grounds for barring the discharge, 67 and it
62. See I I U.S.C.A. § 544(a) (West 1979).
63. See id. § 547(b), (e). Section 547(e)(2)(B) states that a transfer of a security interest is
made when perfected if this occurs more than 10 days after it becomes effective between debtor
and creditor.
64. Id. § 547(b). The legislative history indicates that the trustee may avoid a transfer of a
lien under this section evenif the lien has been enforced by sale before the commencement of the
case. See S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 87, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD.
NEws 5787, 5873; H. R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 372 (1977), reprinted in [1978] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6328.
65. 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(b) (West 1979). Under the old Act judicial liens were specifically cov-
ered by § 67a, I I U.S.C. § 107(a) (1976) (repealed 1978). Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act,
however, judicial liens are avoidable if they come within the general avoidance requirements of
the new § 547(b). 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(b) (West 1979). This is evident because a "transfer of prop-
erty" as used in § 547(b) "means every mode. . . of disposing of or parting with property or with
an interest in property." Id. § 101(40). The legislative history indicates that the term "transfer" is
adopted with certain stylistic changes from the old definition and intended to be as broad as
possible. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 27, reprintedin [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 5787, 5813. The old definition specifically stated that "transfer" includes "fixing a lien
upon property .... " Bankruptcy Act § 1(30), 11 U.S.C. § - (1976) (repealed 1978). See
also 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(d) (West 1979).
66. See 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 524(c), (d) (West 1979).
67. Id. § 727(a)(6).
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is wise to reemphasize the continuing nondischargeability of debts
should this occur. The Reform Act appears to contemplate a second
appearance by the debtor to formally receive the discharge.68 Presuma-
bly the requirements of presence and truthfulness apply here also, but
unless there are reaffirmations, the exercise seems pointless.
Rejection of burdensome executory contracts subject to approval
of the court69 and elimination of faulty liens should be indicated to the
trustee and care taken that the necessary orders are entered. In
nonpilot districts, where trustee compensation depends on the existence
of assets,7" it is unlikely that much initiative can be expected of the
trustee in most consumer cases. The burden surely will fall on the
debtor's attorney to suggest helpful trustee actions when his client is the
sole beneficiary.
The discharge procedures enacted in the 1970 amendments have
been carried forward under the Reform Act without significant
change.7 1 All scheduled debts are for this purpose divided into two
procedural classes. Creditors who take the position that their claims
are nondischargeable under paragraphs (2), (4) and (6) of subsection
(a) of section 523 must apply to the court for a timely decision to that
effect in order to preserve their post-proceeding status.7 2 On other po-
tentially nondischargeable claims, any party may apply for such a deci-
sion, and it may well be in the interest of the debtor to do so. Should a
creditor holding such a claim pursue it after the proceeding is closed,
the debtor must assert his discharge as a defense or reopen the case and
obtain a decision on the issue73 before he can expect the bankruptcy
court to enforce the injunctive effect of his general discharge.74 The
1973 Rules contemplated an adversary proceeding for each such deter-
68. Id. § 524(d).
69. Id. § 365. Most installment purchases contracts are not "executory" for this purpose be-
cause the seller-creditor has no further obligations. Health-spa and cemetery-plot contracts, how-
ever, often remain executory and thus can be avoided.
70. See id. § 330. Professor Shuchman has observed an unusual incidence of "nominal as-
set" cases when trustee fees depend on their existence. Shuchman, Little Bankruptcies in New
England, 56 B.U. L. Rav. 685 (1976).
71. Compare 11 U.S.C.A. § 523 (West 1979) with Bankruptcy Act § 17(c), 11 U.S.C. § 35(c)
(1976) (repealed 1978).
72. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(c) (West 1979).
73. Brown v. Felsen, 99 S. Ct. 2205 (1979), indicated that a state court's judgment on such
issues will not bind a bankruptcy court. Thus the risk of failing to defend a state collection action
may now be minimal.
74. 11 U.S.C.A. § 524 (West 1979), "voids any judgment ... with respect to any debt dis-
charged." In some cases this will not be established until the issue is litigated.
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mination,75 but it is likely that many such proceedings would go by
default. In any event the added cost of litigating these issues would
appear to be much less during, rather than after, the bankruptcy pro-
ceeding.76
IV. POST-PROCEEDING COUNSELING
It may be beyond the call of duty for the general practitioner to
become financial counsellor to his consumer clients, but a responsible
attorney who obtains relief for these clients under the bankruptcy laws
does owe them some effective counseling on the post-discharge situa-
tion. The items covered by such counseling should include reaffirma-
tion and repayment, rights of lien creditors, and debtor recourse against
creditors who illegally continue the chase.
Reaffirmation of discharged debts was both a regular occurrence
and a serious problem under previous bankruptcy legislation.77 The
Bankruptcy Commission originally recommended, total elimination of
the practice 7 but the Reform Act permits it in consumer cases after a
court hearing at which the judge must make a series of findings and
issue a stern warning.79 There is nothing illegal about repayment of
any debt discharged in bankruptcy; indeed it will at times be the right
thing to do. Because post-discharge payments win no longer have the
unintended effect of reviving the old contract obligations,80 a Reform
Act discharge should shift total control over repayment of unsecured
debt to the debtor where it properly belongs. Moreover, there should
be very few occasions when it is truly "in the best interest of the
debtor" to both reaffirm and repay.8'
75. FED. R. BANKR. 409.
76. Costs of litigating dischargeability issues have been held to be legitimate administrative
expenses. In re Spisak, 2 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 1592 (D.N.J. 1977). 11 U.S.C.A. § 330 (West 1979),
authorizes reasonable compensation for actual and necessary services and expenses to the debtor's
attorney. Such awards qualify as priority expenses. Id. § 503o(b)(2).
77. Bankruptcy ,4 Revision, Hearings on HR. 31 and 32 Before the Subcommittee on Civil
and Constitutional Rights of the House Judiciary Committee, 94th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 761-62,
874-75, 943, 946 (1974-1975).
78. REPORT OF THE COMM'N ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R.
Doc. 137, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 142 (1973).
79. I1 U.S.C.A. § 524(d) (West 1979).
80. The Reform Act states clearly that if the discharged debt is consideration supporting the
reaffirmation, the agreement is unenforceable unless approved in court at a discharge hearing. Id.
§ 524(c). But cf. 1 A. COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 17.33-.35 (14th ed. 1978); Annot., 75 A.L.R.
580 (1931) (collecting cases in which intent to reaffirm implied from a post-discharge payment).
81. II U.S.C.A. § 524(c)(4)(A)(ii) (West 1979). Agreements that settle dischargeability litiga-
tion or redemption issues are proper occasions for reaffirmation. Id. § 524(c)(4)(B). Judges who
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Any rights that secured creditors retain in collateral that has been
set off to the debtor as exempt or that has been abandoned by the
trustee as worthless to the estate should be explained clearly to the cli-
ent. The Reform Act has enhanced the ability of consumer debtors to
avoid nonpurchase money liens on exempt items retained for personal
use.82 When legitimate liens remain in effect, however, there is an ad-
ditional remedy available. The Reform Act specifically provides that
the debtor may redeem such property by payment to the creditor in the
amount of the creditor's allowed secured claim.83 This ordinarily will
be the value of the goods as estimated or appraised during the proceed-
ing,84 and in many cases will be considerably less than the remaining
contract debt. The statute does not mention whether redemption is
possible through installment payments.
Prior to 1970, the bankruptcy discharge was simply an affirmative
defense available to the debtor in resisting post-proceeding collection
efforts. The Reform Act carries forward and extends the efforts of a
decade to transform the discharge itself into an effective remedy against
creditors who illegally continue the chase. The statute now flatly states
that the discharge voids judgments and operates as an injunction
against court proceedings, process, or any act to collect the debt.
Thus unless there remains a litigable question about the dischargeabili-
ty of a given debt, creditors should be controlled effectively by the
broad injunctive effect of the Reform Act discharge. Only those who
retain legitimate post-proceeding rights86 can act without risking con-
tempt of the issuing court. The client should be so advised and should
be armed with a form letter with which to respond to illegitimate pres-
sure.
What remains less clear even under the Reform Act is the status of
noncreditor individuals or entities who would like to hold the bank-
ruptcy against a debtor. Public bodies who wish to register their disap-
proval of bankruptcy may run afoul of the doctrine of Perez v.
take a "consenting adult" approach and routinely approve reaffirmations, however, will destroy
the effect of the reform.
82. See id. § 522(0.
83. Id. § 722.
84. Id. § 506(a). This section simply provides that value will "be determined in light of the
purpose of the valuation and of the proposed disposition or use of such property." .d.
85. Id. § 524(a). The phrase "or any act" was added to make it clear that extra-judicial
conduct to collect a debt was in violation of the discharge. Compare id with Note, Section 14f(2)
of the Bankruptcy 4ct: Half a Loaf to the Bankrupt, 14 Hous. L. REv. 486 (1977).
86. See text accompanying notes 24-33 supra.
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Campbell87 and its Reform Act embodiment in section 525.88 There
will necessarily be tension between societal disapproval of bankruptcy
and the fresh start policy reemphasized in the Reform Act. The
Supreme Court decision in Perez sought to put some teeth into the
fresh start by grounding it on the notion of supremacy. The Reform
Act carries the idea forward by providing that "governmental unit[s]"
are forbidden to take discriminatory or coercive action against debtors
"solely because" they have availed themselves of the statutory rem-
edy.89 Problems of proof are significant. Ostensible reasons for firing
employees relieved of their debts may be hard to discredit. Moreover,
other strong policy factors must be considered when, for instance, a bar
applicant sheds his educational debts on the eve of lucrative employ-
ment.90 At present the client can only be told that there is a basis for
resisting discriminatory treatment and be encouraged to seek counsel if
such treatment occurs.
The situation would seem to be more difficult when a private en-
tity seeks to register similar disapproval. So long as the entity is not a
creditor covered by the automatic injunctive effect of the discharge,
there is no express statutory redress. It is to be hoped, however, that
the bankruptcy courts will remain amenable to debtor pleas for protec-
tion of the fresh start against employers who take actions that would be
forbidden to governmental units under section 525. 91 The attorney
who institutes a remedial proceeding should remain available to reopen
the proceeding and seek protection for the client from the bankruptcy
court when this is warranted.
87. 402 U.S. 637 (1971).
88. 11 U.S.C.A. § 525 (West 1979).
89. Id.
90. Compare Florida Board of Bar Examiners re Groot, 365 So. 2d 164 (Fla. 1978), with
Florida Board of Bar Examiners re G.W.L., 364 So. 2d 454 (Fla. 1978).
91. Local Loan v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234 (1934), established the availability of post-proceeding
injunctive relief to protect the fresh start, and nothing in succeeding legislation should diminish its
effect.
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